

Analyticity in Kant's Ethics

In the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant claims that hypothetical imperatives are analytic while categorical imperatives are synthetic.¹ While Kant himself shows little concern about this application of the analytic/synthetic distinction to imperatives, many commentators have found this application puzzling. Consider Kant's famous "containment criterion" of the analytic/synthetic distinction according to which a judgment is analytic if the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept and synthetic otherwise. Since imperatives do not contain subjects nor assert a relation between a predicate and subject, it is difficult to see how this criterion is to be extended to the practical case. The matter is no less puzzling if we understand the analytic/synthetic distinction according to the "contradiction criterion."

¹ Thus, Kant says that imperatives of prudence would be "just as analytic" (*G*, 417) as imperatives of skill if only we could give a determinate concept to happiness, and he calls the categorical imperative a "synthetic-practical proposition *a priori*" (*G*, 420, but cf. *G*, 444, *MM*, 255, *R*, 6-7, and *R*, 11). Also at *G*: 420, Kant contrasts the categorical imperative to hypothetical imperatives because categorical imperatives do not "derive the volition [*das Wollen*] of an action *analytically* from another volition. (emphasis mine)" Citations to Kant's works will be given in parenthesis in the text according to the following abbreviations: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* [*G*], in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); *The Metaphysics of Morals* [*MM*], in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); *Jäsche Logic* [*JL*], in *Lectures on Logic*, ed. and trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), *Critique of Pure Reason* [*A/B*], trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science* [*Prol*], trans. Gary Hatfield in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison, and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* [*R*], trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); "On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be Made Superfluous by an Older One" ["Disc"], trans. Henry Allison in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison, and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). All page numbers refer to the *Akademie* pagination.

According to this criterion, a judgment is analytic if its truth can be discerned either by substitutions of synonymy or by applications of the rules of (general) logic, and it is synthetic otherwise. Although this criterion may extend the distinction to judgments that do not have subject/predicate form, the contradiction criterion does not explain how the distinction can be applied to imperatives. Since imperatives of any sort are incapable of truth or falsity, they are inappropriate objects for substitutions of synonymy or applications of the rules of general logic.

Kant himself does not offer much help understanding this claim, and commentators have either rejected the doctrine altogether as a lapse stemming from Kant's enthusiasm for architectonic connections,² or they have been forced to "fill up the gaps."³ Since the problem is that imperatives do not have the correct form to be classified as either analytic or synthetic, there are two possible strategies here: either the *translation strategy* or the *widening strategy*. The translation strategy attempts to translate imperatives into objects bearing the correct form, i.e. indicative sentences, whereas the widening strategy attempts to extend the analytic/synthetic distinction to accommodate imperatives.⁴ Virtually every commentator who has attempted to

² Thus, some commentators have argued that Kant was simply wrong to assert that the distinction applies to imperatives. See, Bernd Ludwig, "Kant's Hypothetical Imperatives (GMS II, 417-419)" ["Kant's Hypothetical"], in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Christopher Horn and Dieter Schönecker, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), 139-158, at 143; Gerhard Seel, "Sind hypothetische Imperative analytische praktische Sätze?" in *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein Kooperativer Kommentar*, ed. Otfried Höffe, (Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 1989), 148-171, at 148; Robert Paul Wolff, *The Autonomy of Reason, A Commentary on Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 141. Dieter Schönecker has argued that the distinction does apply but that all imperatives are synthetic in *Kant: Grundlegung III: Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs* (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber GmbH, 1990), 90ff.

³ The phrase is from H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy*, [The Categorical Imperative] (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 124. Paton seems to have been the first to have identified this problem and sketched a kind of answer.

⁴ Commentators who have adopted the translation strategy are: Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, 124; Lewis White Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason"*

solve this problem has adopted the translation strategy. Each of these attempts, however, has failed. In consequence of this failure, I will adopt the second strategy and attempt to widen the analytic/synthetic distinction so that it can apply to imperatives.

The key to the success of this strategy will be to identify analytic judgments in the theoretical sphere with judgments whose truths can be determined by general logic. The general logic/transcendental logic distinction allows us to divide the kinds of necessary connection that exists within a judgment. If a judgment is connected to its parts by means of formal/constitutive rules,⁵ it has the necessity of general logic and the judgment is analytic. If, on the other hand, the judgment is necessary but it is known by rules that are not themselves constitutive of our thinking, it has the necessity of transcendental logic, and the judgment is synthetic. While this way of understanding the analytic/synthetic distinction is consonant with contemporary understandings of the analytic/synthetic distinction, it sidelines synonymy and emphasizes the

[A *Commentary*], (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 86; Lewis White Beck, "Apodictic Imperatives" in *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1965, 177-199), at 181-182; Thomas Hill, "The Hypothetical Imperative" *Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, 17-37); Bruce Aune, *Kant's Theory of Morals [Kant's Theory]*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 36-37; Michael McCarthy, "Kant's Application of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction to Imperatives" ["Kant's Application"], *Dialogue* 18: 373-391; Mark Timmons, "Necessitation and Justification in Kant's Ethics" ["Necessitation"], *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22: 223-261. The sole interpretation that I know of that attempts to widen the analytic/synthetic distinction so that it applies to practical objects is Seung Kee Lee in "Why are Kant's Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives Analytic and Synthetic A Priori Practical Propositions?" In *Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kant's : Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongress*, ed. Valerio Rohden, et al. (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 229-239 and in "The Synthetic A Priori in Kant and German Idealism," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 91 (2009): 288-329.

⁵ Constitutivity and formality may come apart. As MacFarlane argues in his dissertation, *What does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal?* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000) and "Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism," *The Philosophical Review* 111 (2002): 25-65, we can say that a rule is constitutive of a faculty if violation of those rules means that one is not even using that faculty at all. Formality, on the other hand, is when the rules reflect restrictions on the faculty rather than the domain of objects toward which the faculty is directed. Kant himself distinguishes but ultimately identifies these two features (A52/B76).

dependence of analyticity on general logic. Although independent textual considerations will be given for this understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, one of its main virtues will be that it can be extended to accommodate practical judgments. Analytic imperatives can be understood as those imperatives whose validity is shown by rules constitutive of practical thought, whereas synthetic imperatives can be understood as those whose validity is shown by rules not-constitutively necessary for practical thought.

An account of how the analytic/synthetic distinction can be applied to practical objects has implications both for how we understand Kant's theory of practical reasoning as well as how we understand the analytic/synthetic distinction. If hypothetical imperatives are analytic because they express rules constitutive of willing and categorical imperatives are synthetic because they express non-constitutive rules, then contemporary understandings of Kant that blur the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives must be re-thought.⁶ In the theoretical sphere, as well, my account departs from some recent trends. Understanding the analytic/synthetic distinction in terms of the general/transcendental logic distinction departs from recent attempts to understand this distinction in terms of the Port Royal Logic of Kant's day.⁷

⁶ See, for example, Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason" ["Normativity"], In *Ethics and Practical Reason*, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 215-255), at 250.

⁷ Two commentators who have defended this interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction are W.R. de Jong and Lanier Anderson. Lanier Anderson, "It Adds up after All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic" ["It Adds up"], *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 69 (2004): 501 – 540, and "The Wolffian Paradigm and Its Discontents: Kant's Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context" ["The Wolffian Paradigm"], *Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie* 87 (2005): 22 – 74. W. R. de Jong, "Kant's Analytic Judgments and the Traditional Theory of Concepts" ["Traditional Theory"], *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33 (1995): 613-641. Ian Proops defends a slightly modified version of the containment characterization, but argues that this characterization cannot escape the standard objections to it and that Kant changes his position after the first *Critique*. Ian Proops, "Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment" ["Kant's Conception"], *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (2005): 588 – 612. I deal with each of these positions in section 2.

1. *The translation strategy*

Attempts to understand Kant's insistence that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be applied to imperatives have been dominated by the translation strategy. As a representative of this strategy, I will consider, the account given by Timmons,⁸ who offers the most explicit and detailed attempt to apply the analytic/synthetic distinction to imperatives by means of translating imperatives into indicative expressions.⁹ Timmons, like all who pursue a translation strategy, adopts the contradiction criterion which allows an extension of the analytic/synthetic distinction to judgments that do not have categorical form. (Again the contradiction criterion says that an analytic judgment is one whose truth can be discerned by substitutions of synonymy or applications of the rules of general logic.)¹⁰ With this understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the background, he argues that the translation of imperatives into indicatives of the proper form is accomplished in three broad steps. The first step is to notice that individual imperatives are instantiations either of a general 'principle of heteronomy' which instructs us to take the means to our ends or of a general 'principle of autonomy' which instructs us to obey the categorical imperative.¹¹ These principles of reasoning supply the standards "that can be used to

⁸ Timmons, "Necessitation."

⁹ Similar, but less detailed accounts can be found in Beck *A Commentary*, Beck "Apodictic Imperatives," Hill "The Hypothetical Imperative," Aune, *Kant's Theory*, McCarthy "Kant's Application." In Korsgaard "Normativity," she takes this to be Kant's view though she goes on to criticize it.

¹⁰ The contradiction criterion is either explicitly or implicitly accepted in Beck's "Apodictic Imperatives," 182, McCarthy's "Kant's Application," 376, and G. Patzig's "Die Logischen Formen Praktischer Sätze in Kants Ethik," *Kant-Studien* 56 (1965): 237-252, at 244.

¹¹ For a criticism of the view that individual imperatives are valid because of their relationship to a single and general Hypothetical Imperative, see Mark Schroeder, "The Hypothetical Imperative?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83 (2005): 357-372 and Jeremy Schwartz, "Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?" [Do Hypothetical Imperatives?], *European Journal of Philosophy* 2010: 84-107.

guide revision of one's intentions."¹² For example, an agent who intends some end but fails to intend the necessary means runs afoul of the principle of heteronomy. Although these principles of practical reasoning are not rules of inference (rules of inference operate on propositions, rather than beliefs or intentions), they are closely related to these rules of inference and outline the norms for changing and forming our intentions.

But principles of practical reasoning cannot be analytic or synthetic any more than individual imperatives can. In order to effect such a classification, a crucial further step is required. These principles of reasoning must be transformed into their "descriptive correlates."¹³ Timmons accomplishes this by transforming them into statements about what S, an incompletely rational agent, would do were she completely rational.¹⁴ All of this leads to the following descriptive correlates:¹⁵

H* = if S were to reason in a completely rational manner, then if S wills some end E and recognizes that doing M is necessary for her bringing about E, then S would M.

and

A* = if S were to reason in a completely rational manner, then she would adopt only those maxims that she recognizes to be universalizable.

Since these transformations are only as clear as the phrase "in a completely rational manner," Timmons explains that an agent reasons in a completely rational manner if the formation and

¹² Timmons "Necessitation," 229. He correctly, follows Beck "Apodictic Imperatives," 182 and McCarthy "Kant's Application", 383 in interpreting Kant's Hypothetical Imperative more like a rule of inference than an actual premise in a practical inference.

¹³ Whereas previous commentators attempted to effect this transformation by means of ideal or completely rational agents (H' = If a completely rational agent wills some end E and recognizes that doing M is necessary for her bringing about E, then she will (infallibly) do M), Timmons advances beyond previous commentators by seeing that such an analysis leaves it completely mysterious why an incompletely rational agent should care or be motivated by what an ideal rationally agent would do.

¹⁴ Timmons, "Necessitation," 230, finds Kantian justification for this strategy in Kant's idea that to say that an action *ought* to take place is to say that "if reason completely determined the will, the action would without fail take place..." (KPV: 20).

¹⁵ I have altered Timmons own version for the sake of simplicity.

revision of her intentions are guided by the principles of practical reasoning.¹⁶ Thus, **H*** is true if the principle of heteronomy is a principle of practical reasoning, and **A*** is true if the principle of autonomy is a principle of practical reasoning. Since **H*** and **A*** are indicative sentences, we can ask of each of them whether they are synthetic or analytic.

We might now think that the translation strategy has been accomplished. It has taken the apparently nonsensical question of whether the negation of an imperative is a contradiction and translated it into a meaningful, related question about an indicative sentence. But Timmons still must show that **H*** is analytic and **A*** is synthetic, and thus explain the analytic status of hypothetical imperatives and the synthetic status of the Categorical Imperative. But it is just here that Timmons arguments fall short.

According to the contradiction criterion, **H*** and **A*** are analytic if the apodoses (descriptive variants of the principles of heteronomy and autonomy) are connected to the protases (the concept of an ‘imperfectly rational agent following the laws of perfect rationality’) by laws of logic and substitutions of synonymy. But, on a very natural understanding of the phrase ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner,’ S reasons rationally when she follows *all* of the correct principles of reasoning. Accordingly, every correct principle of reasoning is part of the concept ‘S reasoning in a completely rational manner.’ Since the principles of autonomy and heteronomy are both correct principles of reasoning, they would each be connected by laws of synonymy to the protasis of **H*** and **A*** respectively—making *both* **H*** and **A*** analytic. But then all imperatives, whether they are hypothetical or categorical, since they are valid in virtue of correct principles of practical reasoning, will be alike analytic.

For this reason a defender of the translation strategy will want to deny that *every* correct

¹⁶ Timmons, “Necessitation,” 229, 233.

principle of reason is part of the definition of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner.’ A correct principle of reason is one that is connected, even necessarily connected, with the concept ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner,’ but only those principles that are connected *analytically* to ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ establish analytic connections. Perhaps, there are some principles of reasoning, which, though correct and therefore in some sense connected with the concept ‘rational agent,’ are not so connected because they are *analytically* part of its definition. Just as ‘effect’ is connected to ‘cause’ by definition whereas ‘event’ is connected to ‘cause’ in some other, non-analytic way, so too the principle of heteronomy is connected to ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ analytically whereas the principle of autonomy is not. This response ensures that only hypothetical imperatives will have analytic correlates and only categorical imperatives will have synthetic correlates.

But this response begs the question. If it were just a matter of figuring out which principles of reasoning were part of the definition of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ and which were not, then perhaps the translation strategy could be deemed a success. But, once we see that, plausibly *all* valid principles of reasoning are part of the definition of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner,’ then the question of which of these principles are analytic and which synthetic becomes acute. Attempting to resolve this by dividing principles of reasoning into those that are *analytically* connected with ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ and those merely *synthetically* connected clearly assumes rather than provides an explanation for the analyticity or syntheticity of imperatives.

Worse still, for the translation strategy, once we have divided principles of reasoning into those that analytically connect the parts of a judgment and those that cannot analytically connect the parts of a judgment, there is no longer any need to take an intermediate translational step. We

may as well say that a judgment is analytic if and only if its parts are connected by principles that are part of the definition of ‘a completely rational believer’ and synthetic otherwise.¹⁷ There is no need to appeal to some third concept of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner.’ Appealing to the concept of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ does not bring in an independent way of understanding which principles of reasoning are analytic and which are synthetic, it assumes that these principles of reasoning have already been so divided and then echoes this distinction by saying that the analytic ones are part of the definition of ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ whereas the synthetic ones are not.

In short, the translation account falls short because 1) it can only distinguish analytic from synthetic judgments if it first distinguishes between those principles of reasoning that are *analytically* connected to ‘reasoning in a completely rational manner’ and those that are *synthetically* connected, and 2) once we have an independent way of so distinguishing, there is no longer any need to translate judgments into their descriptive correlates involving ideally rational believers.

Timmons own account of why **H*** is analytic and **A*** is synthetic reflects these shortcomings. Timmons attempts to distinguish the principle of autonomy from the principle of heteronomy by arguing that it can be understood as a principle of closure whereas the principle of autonomy cannot. Just as a theoretical reasoner who fails to draw conclusions that follow from modus ponens has left her beliefs unclosed, so too a practical reasoner who fails to close her intentions under means-ends reasoning has left her intentions unclosed. Notice, however, that closure is relative to a rule of inference, and rules of inference ground principles of reasoning. This means that if the principle of autonomy is a correct principle of practical reasoning then it

¹⁷ Indeed, this is the strategy that I pursue later in this paper.

too should have a rule of inference associated with it, and someone who fails to draw the appropriate conclusions according to the principle of autonomy can be equally accused of failure of closure relative to the principle of autonomy. The account fails because it does not see that before one can determine whether **A*** and **H*** are analytic or synthetic, we must first have some independent standard for determining whether the principles of autonomy and heteronomy are analytic or synthetic principles of reasoning.

2. The widening strategy-- containment or contradiction?

The failure of the translation strategy suggests a different approach: if imperatives cannot be adjusted to fit the analytic/synthetic distinction, perhaps the analytic/synthetic distinction can be adjusted to fit imperatives. I will pursue this widening strategy by taking the analytic/synthetic distinction as it is used in Kant's theoretical work and trying to generalize this distinction so that it can also apply to imperatives. In other words, the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction will be presented as an instance of a wider genus of which the practical analytic/synthetic distinction is another species.¹⁸ This is accomplished if we can see that each distinction plays the same role in their respective spheres. In other words, I will argue that practical analytic judgments have the same relationship to practical reasoning as theoretical analytic judgments have to theoretical reasoning. It is in virtue of this similarity of function that they can profitably be understood as expressing the same distinction with regard to separate spheres, and it is this similarity that explains Kant's decision to use the same words to capture

¹⁸ There is a sense in which skeptics about the application of the analytic/synthetic distinction to imperatives have been vindicated. Viewing the practical analytic/synthetic distinction as a sibling of the theoretical analytic/synthetic distinction acknowledges that there is a different distinction at work and therefore acknowledges that according to the analytic/synthetic distinction that Kant draws in the first *Critique*, imperatives are simply incapable of being analytic or synthetic.

these different distinctions.

The first hurdle that this strategy faces concerns its starting point. I take as my point of departure the contradiction criterion of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the theoretical sphere. Until recently this decision would have seemed unproblematic to most Kant interpreters. However, powerful attacks on the contradiction criterion by Anderson and Proops make this starting point a controversial one. Anderson has argued that the containment criterion better represents Kant's views and has attempted to defend this interpretation from the traditional charges laid against it. Proops has argued that Kant does not have a univocal understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction but that *none* of the understandings between which he vacillates accords with the orthodox contradiction criterion.

Since a detailed response to these worries would take us too far afield, I content myself with a brief justification of the contradiction criterion as a starting point. De Jong, Anderson, and Proops have each noticed that in the places in which Kant discusses the relationship between contradiction and analyticity, he does not *characterize* analyticity in terms of contradiction. Rather, Kant says that analytic judgments, as determined by the containment criterion, *are true* because of the principle of contradiction.¹⁹ Consequently, the contradiction criterion is not a characterization, as in a definition, of the analytic/synthetic distinction at all but rather an epistemological feature of analytic judgments. A close reading of Kant's texts, therefore, suggests that Kant himself thought the containment criterion to be the *definition* of analytic/synthetic judgment and contradiction to be a further epistemological feature. To understand Kant, these commentators suggest, we must turn our efforts to making sense of the

¹⁹ De Jong, "Traditional Theory," 619, Anderson "The Wolffian Paradigm," 24, Proops, "Kant's Conception" 603. See A151/B190-1, *Prol*, 267.

containment criterion independently of the principle of contradiction.²⁰

But suppose that we accept this exegetical point and acknowledge that Kant intended the containment criterion to serve as the definition of the analytic/synthetic distinction. What, then, is the status of the contradiction criterion? As de Jong notes, it surely doesn't follow from the priority of the containment criterion that the principle of contradiction cannot also be used as an independent criterion for analyticity.²¹ If the principle of contradiction can be used to independently distinguish analytic from synthetic judgments, then taking the contradiction criterion as our starting point seems to be the safer course. If one has doubts about the success of Anderson and de Jong's rehabilitation of the containment criterion, then one can turn to a criterion that is equivalent and untarnished by doubts about its clarity.

But what if the two criteria are not extensionally equivalent? There is no doubting that Kant says quite explicitly that the truth of every analytic judgment can be known through the principle of contradiction (A151/B190), but, as de Jong and Anderson have urged, this does not mean that every judgment whose truth is known through contradiction is analytic.²² Perhaps, there are some judgments picked out as analytic by the contradiction criterion which would be synthetic by the containment criteria. De Jong, correctly I believe, decides against this

²⁰ De Jong and Anderson each try to interpret containment in terms of a traditional logic of concepts. Looking to the Port Royal Logic of Kant's day, they argue that if concepts can be divided in a way analogous to the genus species divisions found in Linnaeus, then containment can be given a non-metaphorical interpretation. For serious doubts about the success of these efforts, see Proops, "Kant's Conception," 599-600. Anderson himself notices one of the most serious objections to his theory, "The Wolffian Paradigm," 51. According to the genus/species account, a red apple and a red rose have nothing in common, since 'red' as an exclusive species of 'apple' and 'red' as an exclusive species of 'rose' can overlap with no other species in the hierarchy. Anderson just thinks that this is another implausible implication of Kant's distinction which Kant himself failed to notice.

²¹ De Jong, "Traditional Theory," 620.

²² Anderson "The Wolffian Paradigm," 24; de Jong, "Traditional Theory," 620.

possibility,²³ but Anderson argues that the two criteria do indeed come apart and that “analyticities express only a fragment of general logic” (46). Moreover, Anderson urges us to prefer the containment criterion to the contradiction criterion as the more central of the two.²⁴

Let us take a closer look, then, at Anderson’s claim that some truths known by the principle of contradiction are synthetic. Anderson acknowledges that Kant leaves many “hints” that the rules of general logic, and hence all judgments known by these rules, are in fact analytic.²⁵ Take for example the following passage from the *Critique*:

The explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgments is a problem with which general logic has nothing to do, indeed whose name it need not even know. (A154/B193)²⁶

If general logic has “nothing to do with explaining the possibility of synthetic judgments,” it would seem that Kant is saying straightforwardly that judgments whose truth can be known by general logic are one and all analytic. However, since Anderson believes that there is a distinction between what Kant in fact said and what he ought to have said, such textual citations

²³ De Jong, “Traditional Theory,” 638.

²⁴ Anderson “The Wolffian Paradigm,” 43 – 44. For an example of a judgment whose truth can be known by the principle of contradiction but which is not analytic, Anderson tells us to compare the following two hypothetical syllogisms: ‘if Socrates is human, then he is mortal, and Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal’ and ‘if there is justice, evil will be punished, and there is justice; therefore, evil will be punished.’ The first syllogism, argues Anderson, follows from the containment criterion because ‘Socrates’ is a species of ‘human’ and ‘human’ is a species of ‘mortal.’ The conditional establishes the relative positions of each of the concepts in a Linnaeus-like hierarchy, and the conclusion follows directly from these considerations. In the second syllogism, however, there is no one concept that appears in each step, and therefore the conclusion does not follow by establishing that the subject of the conclusion is in a certain hierarchical relationship to the concept of the conclusion. However, since Kant believed that all hypothetical syllogisms, even those like the second, belong to general logic, it follows that under the containment characterization, as understood by Anderson, some syllogisms derivable with general logic cannot be derived through the logic of containment. The judgments formed from such syllogisms would be synthetic according to the containment criterion but analytic according to the contradiction criterion.

²⁵ Anderson. “The Wolffian Paradigm,” 42.

²⁶ See also *Prol* 275, where Kant says that synthetic a priori judgments must “rest on principles other than the principle of contradiction,” implying that all judgments that rest on the principle of contradiction are analytic. Compare A154/B193.

are not conclusive. In short, Anderson believes that: 1) the two criteria come apart since there are some judgments which can be shown to be true by means of general logic which are not analytic according to the containment criterion, 2) given that the two criteria are extensionally distinct, the containment criterion ought to be preferred to the contradiction criterion as the authentically Kantian sense of analyticity, and 3) the textual evidence that indicates that Kant believed all truths of general logic to be analytic simply shows that Kant himself was unaware of the implications of his own definitions.

Although I do not agree with Anderson in thinking the two criteria come apart (1),²⁷ it is on (2) that I will focus my attention in the remaining part of this section. I will argue that if the two criteria disagree we should accept the contradiction criterion rather than the containment criterion as the one more central to Kant's project.

Since Anderson acknowledges that the text supports both interpretations, an answer to this question ought to be constrained not only by what Kant says about the analytic/synthetic distinction but the uses to which he puts it. Kant himself thought that the analytic/synthetic distinction, and in particular the distinction between the analytic a priori and the synthetic a priori, was a watershed moment in the history of philosophy and that seeing this distinction clearly is what separates transcendental philosophy from pre-critical metaphysics. In the *Prolegomena*, he says that this distinction "deserves to be classical" in the critique of human understanding, but confesses that he doesn't know "that it has much utility anywhere else" (*Prol*, 270), and in "On a Discovery..." Kant argues that merely getting clear on the distinction would

²⁷ See de Jong, "Traditional Theory," 635-638 for a persuasive argument that Kant distinguishes between synthetic a priori and analytic a priori truths on the basis of whether they involve principles besides the principle of contradiction. If they do, then they are synthetic, if they don't then they are analytic. This implies that any judgment whose truth can be determined by the principle of contradiction is analytic. See "Disc," 229.

have been enough to ensure the existence of a previous critique of pure reason (“Disc,” 244). In the *Critique* itself, Kant claims that the real question of how a priori knowledge is possible in all of its forms can be brought “under the formula of a single problem” (B19) where the single problem is how synthetic a priori as opposed to analytic a priori judgments are possible. Indeed, at one point in the *Prolegomena*, Kant claims that “the whole of transcendental philosophy... is itself nothing other than simply the complete solution of the question presented here [i.e. how are synthetic a priori judgments possible]” (*Prol*, 279).

These claims, I submit, provide constraints on any understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction: 1) synthetic a priori judgments must be the sorts of things that require the whole of transcendental philosophy to explain how they are possible; 2) synthetic a priori judgments should also be the sorts of things the understanding of which provides the key to understanding how a priori knowledge of objects is possible. The containment criterion, however, if interpreted to make it independent of the contradiction criterion, would make it impossible to see how either of these constraints could be met. If Anderson is right, then the truth of a large subset of synthetic a priori judgments depends merely on the rules of general logic. As such, it is difficult to see how these synthetic a priori truths could require the whole of transcendental philosophy to explain their possibility. Moreover, since general logic abstracts from questions about the relationship between our concepts and the objects that these concepts are about, it is equally difficult to see how any truth of general logic could help us understand how a priori knowledge of objects is possible. By narrowing the class of analytic judgments to include only “a fragment of general logic,” we have opened up the class of synthetic a priori judgments to include

judgments whose possibility is neither as mysterious nor fecund as Kant claims.²⁸

3. Analyticity and the constitutivity of general logic

The widening strategy seeks to extend the contradiction characterization so that practical judgments can be analytic or synthetic. Since the contradiction characterization makes reference to general logic and synonymy, we need a way of extending at least one of these so that they will apply to practical judgments as well as theoretical. In this section, I will argue that general logic can be extended in this way. The key is to note that, for Kant, what makes a rule a rule of general logic is that it is constitutive of theoretical thinking. If this conclusion can be established then the contradiction characterization implies that analytic judgments are just those judgments whose

²⁸ Perhaps, Anderson would reply by saying that he does not maintain that the truth of *all* synthetic judgments can be ascertained by means of general logic, but only a subset of them. According to this response, we could distinguish between two types of synthetic a priori judgments. The first kind would contain those judgments whose truth could be discerned by general logic but which could not be captured by Anderson's genus/species hierarchies, whereas the second kind would contain those judgments whose truth could not be discerned by general logic at all. When Kant raises the question about the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge and its connection to the whole of transcendental philosophy, he is speaking about the second kind of synthetic a priori judgments. Although nothing is preventing Kant or anyone else from further subdividing synthetic a priori judgments, in effect, the response concedes that the criterion that is most central to Kant is the contradiction criterion. In particular, it concedes that when Kant raises the question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, he is concerned to divide up our judgments into those whose truth do not rely upon general logic and those whose truth do rely upon general logic. It is this distinction that the contradiction characterization captures, and it is, therefore, this distinction that Kant must have in mind when he introduces the analytic/synthetic distinction. The fecundity of synthetic a priori judgments rests precisely upon the fact that they do not abstract from the relationship that thought has to its objects. In other words, synthetic a priori judgments are fecund because they are part of transcendental rather than general logic. Any judgments that are true because of the principle of contradiction are neither fecund nor mysterious, and they can therefore not be classified as synthetic. I conclude that, despite the interesting work of Anderson and de Jong, the contradiction criterion is still the safest starting point when talking about Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction.

truth can be known by rules that are constitutive of theoretical reasoning and synonymy. This formulation allows for a natural extension to the practical sphere. If analytic theoretical judgments are those whose truth can be known solely by rules constitutive of theoretical reasoning, analytic practical judgments would be ones whose validity can be known solely by rules constitutive of practical reasoning and synonymy.

The connection between general logic and the constitutive rules of thinking can, I believe, be textually established.²⁹ Everything in nature, Kant points out in the *Jäsche Logic*, has rules according to which it operates (*JL*, 13). Our understanding too, even though it may be the source of these rules or at least the source for comprehending objects according to rules, must itself have rules according to which it operates. Such rules are the "absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place..." (A 52/B 76; A151/B191, *JL*, 12), and general logic is that which has these rules as its subject matter. In a word, general logic is the science that governs the constitutive rules of thinking. It follows that a judgment whose truth depends only upon the constitutive rules of thought, is one that can be derived simply from the laws of general logic.³⁰ In later sections, I will show that that practical judgments can also be usefully divided into those whose validity can be derived by rules constitutive of practical thinking and those whose validity can only be derived by supplementing these constitutive rules with further rules.

²⁹ Here I follow MacFarlane, *Dissertation: What does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal* [Dissertation], University of Pittsburgh (2000); "Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism" ["Logicism"], *The Philosophical Review* 111 (2002): 25-65.

³⁰ To say that the rules of general logic are constitutive of thought does not mean that they cannot ever be violated. Korsgaard and MacFarlane show that the norms of an activity can be constitutive and normative at the same time. One can, for example, communicate while ignoring some of the rules of grammar, but to consider oneself perfectly free from grammatical rules would undermine the possibility of communication. Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009): 30. MacFarlane "Logicism," 37.

4. *Is understanding analyticity through constitutivity circular?*

Since my criticism of the translation strategy was that it was circular, it is important to see how the account that I suggest avoids a similar charge. After all, to say that the predicate, ‘unmarried’, is *constitutive* of the subject, ‘bachelor,’ might be to say that being unmarried is a necessary requirement for being a bachelor—perhaps even part of the *meaning* of the term ‘bachelor.’ In order to dispel this air of circularity, it is important to recognize that necessity is being applied first to the judgment and then to the rule of thinking that connects the parts of the judgment. One of the goals of the analytic/synthetic distinction is to mark off two different species of necessity. Kant accomplishes this differentiation by distinguishing between the necessity of a judgment and the necessity of the rules whereby the judgment is known. This generates the familiar four possibilities:

		Necessary/Contingent Distinction Applied to the Judgment	
		The judgment is contingent—e.g. the subject is only contingently related to the predicate.	The judgment is necessary—e.g. The subject is necessarily connected to the predicate.
Necessary/Contingent Distinction Applied to The Rules Connecting the Parts of the Judgment	The rules that connect the parts of the judgments are contingent features of thought.	Synthetic A Posteriori	Synthetic A Priori

	The rules that connects the parts of the judgment are rules that are necessary features of thinking.	Analytic A Posteriori	Analytic A Priori
--	--	-----------------------	-------------------

Thus, the judgment ‘the chair abuts the wall’ is doubly contingent. Firstly, the judgment itself is contingent, because it is a contingent fact about chairs that they may or may not abut walls, and therefore the subject term ‘chair’ is only contingently related to the predicate term ‘abutting the wall.’ However, this judgment is also contingent in a further sense. Consider the way in which we know this judgment to be true. Whatever justifies us in believing that the chair abuts the wall, it is not justified exclusively by rules that are constitutive of our thinking. Failure to assent to this judgment makes us empirically in error, but it does not threaten the coherence of our thinking.

Kant claims that there can be no contingent judgments that are based on necessary rules of thinking because he believes that a judgment whose truth is known by rules constitutive of our thinking cannot be contingent.

When we consider necessary judgments, however, there are two different ways in which their necessity can be explained: they can be true because that is the way we must think and they can be true for some other reason. Analytic judgments are true because they follow from norms the violation of which would threaten the very coherence of our thinking. Synthetic a priori judgments, on the other hand, do not follow from such constitutive norms—their necessity must rest not solely in the way we must think but also in the way the *objects* of our thought are connected. If it is possible for judgment to be necessarily true for reasons that have nothing to do with the way we must think, then it is possible to distinguish the analytic a priori from the

synthetic a priori.

Obviously, the above does not amount to a defense of this interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction. This table, and the explanation that underlies it, depends upon many unexplained Kantian assumptions. It depends, for example, upon Kant's idea that judgments are an act of holding the parts of the judgment together by means of rule. It depends also upon Kant's ability to explain how a judgment may be necessary without resting for its truth on the way we must think. A rationalist, for example, might argue that the only way for a judgment to be necessary is if it is founded on necessary rules for thinking. This would be to deny that there are any synthetic a priori judgments. However, it should be clear that the explanation provided here does *not* depend upon a prior understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction as the circularity objection claims. If we recognize the distinction between the necessity of a judgment and the necessity of the rules that explain this necessity, then the distinction will not be circular.

5. What has happened to synonymy?

This should seem like a modest result. Since the contradiction criterion of the analytic/synthetic, contains an explicit appeal to general logic, it should come as no surprise to find that the analytic/synthetic distinction depends upon our ability to distinguish general from non-general logic.³¹ The clarity of the analytic/synthetic distinction famously rests upon our

³¹ The standard view is usually derived as an improvement on the "containment characterization." According to the "containment characterization," a judgment is analytic if the predicate belongs to the subject "as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept" (A6/B10) and synthetic otherwise. Since the containment criterion has been criticized since Kant's day as being on the one hand too narrow (it applies only to categorical judgments) and on the other hand too phenomenological (the metaphor of containment seems to provide no real guide for distinguishing analytic from synthetic judgments), commentators have usually been

ability to spell out exactly in what the synonymy condition consists. The above merely points out that it depends equally on the clarity of the other half of its definition--the distinction of general logic from non-general logic. I have simply noted that Kant distinguishes between general logic and non-general logic on the grounds that the former are composed of constitutive rules of thought and the latter are not.

In another sense, however, my interpretation is less familiar since it sidelines the synonymy condition. According to my interpretation, the essential distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments can be drawn even without synonymy. For example, the judgment: ‘if A, then B; & A; therefore B’ depends for its truth only upon rules constitutive of thinking and is therefore analytic even though it contains no substitutions of synonymy.³² If there are any necessary judgments that are not of this form, then they are synthetic a priori and the distinction has been drawn. As long as there are some judgments that are necessary but not because they follow from rules constitutive of thinking, then there is a distinction that is functionally equivalent to Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction. There will be analytic judgments whose necessity is easy to understand, i.e. they are necessary because that is the way that we must think,

more than happy to take the contradiction characterization as Kant’s considered view and to discard the containment characterization altogether. Commentators who accept this standard story and choose the contradiction account are: Graham Bird, *The Revolutionary Kant*, (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), 69-70; James Van Cleve, *Problems from Kant*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 20, Henry Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 74-76; Henry Allison, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); W. H. Walsh, *Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics*, (Edinburgh: University Press, 1975), 7-11; D. P. Dryer, *Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 37-43; and W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 21-23. Famously, Quine ultimately rejects the distinctions. See Anderson “The Wolffian Paradigm,” 23, for a similar story.

³² For a simpler example, the judgment ‘a=a’ (B17) would also be analytic. Kant himself seemed to waiver on this matter. Proops has shown that in his later writings, Kant came to believe that analytic judgments must be informative and thus he excluded identical judgments. Proops, “Kant’s Conception,” 602. My own interpretation does not depend upon this since non-identical logical truths can be informative.

and synthetic a priori judgments whose necessity requires a transcendental deduction. Kant's examples clearly indicate that he believed that substitution by synonymy was an unproblematic operation that followed from the rules constitutive of thinking, but one could deny this and still accept the distinction between analytic and synthetically necessary judgments.

6. Application to practical reason

The benefit of emphasizing the dependence of the analytic/synthetic distinction on the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive rules of thinking is that it can be extended naturally to the practical sphere. Unlike thinking, which is directed at truth, practical reasoning is directed at action. Practical reasoning makes no claims on what we ought to believe but rather on what we ought to do. With this difference in mind, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be extended as follows: a practical judgment is analytic if its validity depends only upon rules that are constitutive of practical reasoning whereas a practical judgment is synthetic if its validity depends upon rules that are not constitutive of practical reasoning. Besides for swapping out truth for validity and thinking for practical reasoning, this way of understanding the analytic/synthetic distinction models closely the one that I defended in the previous section. In this section, I will defend this practical interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction by applying it to hypothetical and categorical imperatives and showing that, just as Kant says, the former turn out to be analytic and the latter synthetic.

Hypothetical imperatives are analytic if their validity depends only upon rules that are constitutive of practical reasoning. The question then becomes on what does the validity of hypothetical imperatives depend? Kant takes up this question when, in the *Groundwork*, he asks what accounts for the "necessitation of the will" (G, 417) in hypothetical imperatives. His answer

is as follows:

How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power. This proposition is, as regards the volition, analytic; for in the volition of an object as my effect, my causality as acting cause, that is, the use of means, is already thought... (G, 417)

I have said that hypothetical imperatives are analytic if their validity depends upon a constitutive principle of practical reason. Here Kant identifies this principle:

H' = Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means...³³

Kant asserts that **H'** is analytic. Although we are ultimately interested in the analyticity of the imperatives which depend upon **H'** and not **H'** itself, Kant directs our attention to the analyticity of the latter. Hypothetical imperatives are analytic, Kant seems to say, because the principle on which they depend is analytic.

But the analyticity of **H'** is itself problematic. As a principle of reasoning, **H'** is properly speaking neither a theoretical nor a practical proposition at all. At first glance, it may seem to be theoretical. To accept **H'** would require an adjustment in our beliefs and only indirectly influences our actions. In the explanation of the proposition which Kant gives after the semicolon, he points out that the proposition constrains what is "*thought*" - if we think of someone as having willed ends, we *must* also think of them as having willed the means. Since **H'** says what we ought to believe, it seems to be theoretical. On the other hand, there is the all-important qualification that Kant provides in the parentheses. The judgment only holds "insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions." This makes the judgment markedly different

³³ It is **H'** that Timmons is trying to capture with the previously discussed **H***. I believe that his attempt to capture **H'** is a good one. Of course, **H*** is supposed to be the descriptive correlate of **H'**. For reasons that I shortly discuss, I believe that it is best to leave **H'** as a principle of reasoning.

from other analytic judgments in the theoretical sphere. To assert that 'bachelors are unmarried men,' implies that it would be quite impossible to encounter a married bachelor. However, to assert that there is a connection between willed ends and willed means does not preclude the possibility of encountering *akratic* behaviors. In other words, the proposition is a normative one – it is a statement about how the world would be if it were as it ought to be. But this makes it sound as if the proposition is not theoretical after all.

But other principles of reasoning also fail to be theoretical or practical propositions. Consider modus ponens, and its associated principle of reasoning, which we might call **MP'**. **MP'** shares the peculiar features of **H'**—it is descriptive and normative, theoretical and practical. On the one hand, it seems to make a claim about what we ought to believe. Surely **MP'** recommends that everyone ought to *believe* that someone who failed to believe the consequences of their beliefs is not being rational. On the other hand, it is a normative rule that is meant to guide us in the revision and formation of our beliefs. This commonality is not surprising. **MP'** and **H'** are alike principles of reasoning meant to guide the revision and formation of our beliefs and intentions they are not themselves proper objects of belief or intention.

But then in what sense is **H'** analytic? I have argued that a judgment is analytic if the principle of reasoning upon which it is based is constitutive of the faculty that it governs. According to this understanding, principles of reasoning are that in terms of which analyticity and syntheticity are to be understood, and they are strictly speaking incapable of being either analytic or synthetic. However, just because of the tight connection between the principles of reasoning and the kinds of judgments that can be derived by means of these reasoning, it seems possible to extend the analytic/synthetic distinction to the foundational principles themselves. According to this natural extension a principle of reasoning is analytic if it supports analytic

judgments and a principle of reasoning is synthetic if it supports synthetic judgments. For example, a judgment whose truth can be discerned by means of **MP'** is an analytic judgment because **MP'** is constitutive of theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, I now suggest that it is natural to call **MP'** itself analytic because of its tight connection with analytic judgments.

It is in this way that I think we should understand Kant's claim that **H'** is analytic. Strictly speaking, **H'** is not the sort of thing that could be practical or theoretical, analytic or synthetic. However, if **H'** is constitutive of practical thought then practical judgments whose validity can be discerned by means of **H'** (i.e. hypothetical imperatives) will be analytic. Just because of this fact, there will be an extended sense in which **H'** as the source of analytic judgments could itself be called analytic. It is just this sort of reasoning, that I suggest Kant appeals to in this famous passage when he emphasizes that hypothetical imperatives derive their analytic status from the status of **H'** from which they are derived.

Consider the very next paragraph where Kant asserts for the first time, and most directly, that hypothetical imperatives are analytic:

If only it were as easy to give a determinate concept of happiness, imperatives of prudence would agree entirely with those of skill and would be just as analytic. For it could be said, here just as there: who wills the end also wills (necessarily in conformity with reason) the sole means to it...(G, 418)³⁴

Imperatives of skill are directly said to be analytic, and of imperatives of prudence, it is said that they *would be* analytic if 'happiness' were a more determinate concept. Importantly, Kant says that the reason why these judgments are analytic is they depend upon **H'** which is offered as a necessary principle of reasoning. The analyticity of individual hypothetical imperatives follows from the fact that **H'** is itself a necessary principle of practical reasoning.

When Kant takes up the corresponding question about the grounds of the possibility of the

³⁴ Later, Kant explicitly claims that both kinds of hypothetical imperatives are analytic (G, 419).

Categorical Imperative, he does not provide a corresponding principle of reasoning on which the Categorical Imperative is based. In fact, instead of answering this question, he pleads difficulty and postpones this task until the final section (*G*, 419-420). One thing that Kant does tell us, however, is that the answer will be radically different from the answer to the question of how analytic a priori judgments are possible:

Second, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality the ground of the difficulty (of insight into its possibility) is also very great. It is an a priori synthetic practical proposition; and since it is so difficult to see the possibility of this kind of proposition in theoretical cognition, it can be readily gathered that the difficulty will be no less in practical cognition. (*G*, 420)

Whatever provides for the validity of categorical imperatives, we know that it is *not* the sort of thing that admits of an easy explanation. An explanation of the validity of the Categorical Imperative goes beyond the scope of this paper, but its difficulty implies that it cannot be grounded by any principle constitutive of practical reasoning. We do know, however, that such an argument will not simply rely upon showing that categorical reasoning is ingredient in practical reasoning.

The most direct evidence that Kant believes that the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives rests upon the kind of rule on which they depend for their validity comes in a footnote. Kant has just, for the first time, called the categorical imperative an “*a priori* synthetical practical proposition” (*G*, 420), and he explains that the categorical imperative, unlike hypothetical imperatives: “is a practical proposition which does not analytically derive the willing of an action from some other volition already presupposed” (*G*: 420). By contrast to categorical imperatives, then, the *Groundwork* seems to supply the following characterization of hypothetical imperatives:

GC [*Groundwork* Characterization]: Hypothetical imperatives are practical propositions which, unlike categorical imperatives, *do* analytically derive the willing of an action from some already presupposed volition.

Three features of **GC** are here relevant: F1) Literally **GC** asserts that hypothetical imperatives are said to be propositions containing a sort of *derivation*. F2) **GC** also asserts that both the premises as well as the conclusion of this derivation are volitions. F3) Kant also uses the term ‘analytic’ as an adverb qualifying the type of derivation that is involved when we move from volition to volition.

Each of these features confirms a facet of my interpretation. I have argued that analytic judgments rest on the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive inference, and an analytic judgment is one whose validity can be derived from rules constitutive of practical reason. But if this is accepted, then the fact that Kant slides easily from practical propositions to derivations (F1) is explained by his belief that determining the epistemic status of imperatives involves asking about the kind of rules involved in deriving their validity. Moreover, this also explains how ‘analytic’ can be used to modify the verb ‘derive’ (F3). The contradiction characterization asserts that a derivation is analytic if and only if it can be accomplished by means of constitutive inference rules. This means that Kant’s insistence that hypothetical imperatives can be *analytically* derived is making a qualification on the type of derivation that is contained in this practical proposition – namely one that follows from the constitutive rules of practical inference. Finally, given the distinction that I have been drawing throughout this paper between theoretical reasoning which governs the formation and revision of beliefs and practical reasoning that governs the formation and revision of intentions, it should come as no surprise to see Kant insisting that practical reasoning arrives at the willing of an action (F2). What the footnote claims therefore, is that hypothetical imperatives, unlike categorical imperatives, are governed by principles of reasoning that analytically connect the parts of the judgment. Categorical imperatives on the other hand, do not connect the parts analytically. If my

interpretation is correct, then to connect something analytically means that the rules according to which the validity of the proposition is derived are all rules constitutive of practical reason.

Conclusion

Kant's assurance that the analytic/synthetic distinction applies to imperatives as well as theoretical judgments has seemed problematic to many commentators. Does Kant fall victim here to his propensity to architectonic thinking? Are the places in which Kant seems to apply the distinction best understood figuratively? I hope to have shown that neither of these alternatives is necessary. I believe that Kant did in fact believe that hypothetical imperatives are analytic judgments and that much can be learned about Kant's theory of practical reasoning by paying serious attention to this belief. If we take Kant at his word here, the following picture of hypothetical imperatives emerges: 1) Hypothetical imperatives contain practical propositions whose parts are related to each other by rules constitutive of practical reasoning; 2) these rules are to be understood analogously to theoretical inference rules but they are not reducible to them; 3) there is another mode of practical inference that is not simply constitutive and which reveals actions to be practically necessary but not constitutively practically necessary. This mode of inference is captured in the categorical imperative.

That practical reason has a component analogous to theoretical logic is hardly a new thought. Historically, however, attempts to specify this practical logic have met serious and persuasive objections.³⁵ It might seem therefore, that all I have succeeded in doing is attributing

³⁵ Historical attempts to specify this practical logic include George Von Wright, "Practical Inference". *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963): 159-179, and A. J. Kenny "Practical Inference." *Analysis* 26 (1966): 65-75. Criticisms have been raised in G.E.M. Anscombe, "Practical

to Kant a position that is a philosophical dead end. If Kant believed that there was a formal component to practical reason so much the worse for Kant. Although I do not believe this to be the case, here I can only express my hope that the results of this paper will provoke new attempts to respond to these objections and will point to Kant's writings as a potential resource in developing these responses.

Inference" in *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory*, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1-34), and Niko Kolodny, "Instrumental Transmission", draft #8.